Debates around sound corporate governance propose board diversity as a key attribute to sufficiently challenge executive management for stakeholder engagement. This study contributes to this debate by empirically investigating the effect of board diversity on corporate social disclosure (CSD) of Vietnamese listed firms. The study finds a significantly positive effect of diversity-in-boards (dissimilarities among directors within a board, i.e., demographic attributes of board members) on CSD while diversity-of-boards (dissimilarities among firm boards, i.e., board structure) has no effect on CSD. The results contribute by showing that a single theoretical approach can provide an adequate explanation for board diversity. The study contributes methodologically by demonstrating the design and measurement of board diversity indices, and a three-dimensional stakeholder-relevant CSD index. The findings benefit regulators and corporate executives in better understanding firms' CSD practices and stakeholders' expectations. 
Introduction
A board of directors is the cornerstone of corporate governance frameworks. There are numerous factors that signify various dimensions of a board, and board diversity is one of the most important (Kang et al. 2007, Milliken and Martins 1996) . The breadth of factors relating to board diversity make it difficult to define the term explicitly (Harrison and Klein 2007) .
Several scholars have examined the implications of board diversity in relation to firm's outcomes by defining it operationally (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) . Some studies refer to board diversity as a demographic phenomenon entailing age, gender, and ethnicity, while others refer to board diversity as a structural phenomenon comprising CEO duality, board independence, and director ownership. Hafsi and Turgut's (2013) study differs from prior studies in approaching the factors of board diversity from both dimensions. They classify factors relating to the demographic phenomenon as a diversity-in-boards index, and factors relating to the structural phenomenon as a diversity-of-boards index.
Although such stakeholder scrutiny is much stronger in developed nations, recent empirical studies have shown an increasing trend of corporate social responsibility disclosure in developing countries (Haji 2013) . Despite this welcome trend, studies in both developed and developing countries have mainly focused on disclosure quantity (Ho and Wong 2001, Xiao and Yuan 2007) , and a limited number of empirical studies have investigated disclosure quality (Haji 2013) . To combine disclosure quantity and disclosure quality, this study measures corporate social disclosure (CSD) using three dimensions which combine disclosure quantity and two aspects of disclosure quality from the stakeholder perspective: the quality of the items disclosed and the quality of the types of disclosure about CSD, as perceived by stakeholders.
This investigation is especially pertinent to developing countries, where the understanding of CSD practices is still poor because such practices are perceived as philanthropic activities.
Bui (2010) also shows that in the past Vietnamese firms have paid little attention to CSD for three main reasons: the firms do not understand disclosure impacts on society, and lack both financial resources and an enforcing legal framework. These factors have discouraged firms from adopting CSD in their corporate policies. While international economic integration has helped Vietnamese businesses to expand their activities globally, they have been also facing important issues for sustainable development, especially relating to society and the environment. Recent scandals concerning serious factory-generated pollution of the Thi-Vai river and various health safety cases such as tainted milk distribution, toxic ingredients in consumer goods, and pesticide residue in vegetables have resulted in a greater concern for social responsibility in Vietnam. Along with these environmental and health issues, Vietnamese export companies have been also encountering issues relating to certification and standards when their foreign investors and buyers require them to adopt business practices based on respect for people, communities and the environment. For example, the U.S.-
Vietnam textiles agreement of 2003 included an obligation for the Vietnamese authorities to
encourage exporting companies to implement corporate social responsibility codes in the U.S. and disclose about them in return for access to the U.S. market. Additionally, Vietnam's tenyear Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) shows the beginnings of a policy focus on structural reforms, environmental sustainability, social equity, and macro-economic stability (World Bank 2015).
It is proposed that board diversity can help challenge management to show responsibility beyond shareholders (CIMA 2011) . This is pertinent to a country such as Vietnam, as explosive economic growth propelled by Vietnamese firms can also bring social problems. In spite of an increasing awareness of CSD among Vietnamese firms recently, there has not been any research that has examined the effect of board diversity on CSD in Vietnamese listed firms.
As adopted by Strand (1983) , corporate social performance refers to a firm's anticipated or existing social demands, and corporate social disclosures are disclosures about these demands. Importantly, this study does not equate CSD with social performance, the locus of a great debate in the literature (Ullmann 1985) . We focus here on CSD in annual reports rather than on social performance because CSD, similar to earnings, is easily spotted (Yip et al., 2011) . Annual reports are the main public document and are regularly produced to communicate corporate review, whereas measuring social performance, especially in developing countries like Vietnam, is difficult because there is no database from which to elicit information about such performance. In addition, in the absence of formalized social performance information in databases, and given that measuring social performance requires measuring from several dimensions, manual measurement can lead to higher margins of error (Yip et al. 2011 ).
Literature review
Recent research has shown that CSD brings firms greater utility. Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) find that firms with better CSD have lower capital constraints and better access to finance. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) show that firms experience a decrease in cost of equity capital after issuing a CSR report. Dhaliwal et al. In this context, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) make a vital contribution to understanding board diversity. Examining the influence of board diversity from two dimensions on the social performance of firms listed on S&P 500, they discover that diversity-in-boards is statistically significant and positively related to social performance, and that diversity-of-boards does not significantly influence social performance.
There is only one study (Vu et al. 2011 ) that has investigated the influence of corporate governance on voluntary disclosures, including social disclosure, in Vietnam. Looking at 45
Vietnamese listed firms in 2008, that study uses the percentage of independent directors as a proxy measure for corporate governance, and measures the disclosure quantity. Controlling for the influence that ownership structure can have on voluntary disclosures, Vu et al. (2011) find low disclosure levels among Vietnamese listed firms. They also find that state ownership in firms negatively influences social disclosure, but managerial ownership positively influences disclosure. Additionally, larger firms are positively associated with voluntary disclosure.
This study embraces the dichotomous classification of the diversity of the board of directors adopted by Hafsi and Turgut (2013) . However, this study contextualizes the attributes of diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards to Vietnam, an emerging market. This is done on the basis that prior research concludes that governance structures probably develop endogeneity depending on firm-specific characteristics and the unique business environment 
Theoretical framework
Resource dependence theory and agency theory are two organizational theories that underpin how board diversity influences CSD (Bear et al. 2010 Board diversity is presented as both fiduciary and advisory in nature. These roles may affect CSD differently. From the fiduciary perspective, agency theory offers an intention of the board of directors to monitor managerial actions affecting shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983 ). This monitoring role ensures that the interest of managers aligns with that of shareholders, including minority shareholders (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983) . The key aim of the board of directors' fiduciary duty is to minimize agency costs. Since monitoring is a fiduciary function of the board, how effectively a board monitors whether managers act to serve their self-interest rather than the interests of the shareholders they represent can differ between boards.
From the advisory perspective of governance, the diversity among board members within a firm is a resource firms depend on for good governance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978 ).
Resource dependence theory shows that improving social relationships is likely to result in economic returns for a firm (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) . Resource dependence theory suggests that the board of directors is a resource for a firm, comprising expertise, advice, reputation, and information networks that the directors bring to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003) .
Diversity among board members can engage responsibility towards society as well as towards shareholders, as some directors can introduce values such as economic development being concomitant with moral development (Boyd 1990 , Labelle et al. 2010 ).
Research hypotheses
The structural attributes of the board are vital to corporate governance practices (Haniffa and In analyzing the annual report content of Vietnamese firms, one author coded all the annual reports for the social information to ensure consistent and valid data collection. This was repeated after two weeks by the same author (Haji 2013, Weetman and Ghazali 2006) to establish intra-rater reliability. As a second step to establish inter-rater reliability, another author coded ten randomly selected annual reports and found no significant difference between the two coders. It should be noted that reliability of content analysis can be achieved through having multiple coders, or alternatively by having a single coder assign the scores and then take some additional time to review the assigned scores (Neuendorf, 2002 , Haji 2013 This study uses the social indicators section in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3.1 framework to measure CSD. The framework is versatile across firms and geographies.
Currently, the GRI framework is extensively used to assess and measure Sustainability 
Measuring disclosure quantity
This study measures disclosure quantity, by assigning "1" if an item is present in the annual 
Measuring disclosed item quality and disclosed type quality
Using the binary approach to measure disclosure quantity has been criticized for assuming all disclosure items are equally important (Barako et al. 2006 ). Lu and Abeysekera (2014) overcome that assumption by combining the importance of disclosure items and the importance of disclosure types into disclosure quantity, in examining social and environmental disclosure. They ascertain the importance of disclosure items (i.e., disclosed item quality) and disclosure types (i.e., disclosed type quality) by questioning 12 stakeholders, and assign weights accordingly. Following the approach initiated by Lu and Abeysekera stakeholder-specific groups were requested to rate each item from zero to 10 based on their perceptions of how important the item was to them and how the items should be disclosed. In relation to how an item should be disclosed, they evaluated four disclosure types (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical)
for each item using a zero-to-10 rating scale.
The weight for a particular item is computed by the total of the integer values assigned to the item and then divided by the number of individuals who responded to the item. Similarly, the level of importance for each type (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) of a particular item is calculated by the total of the integer values assigned to each particular type of disclosure for each item and then divided by the number of respondents for this type. A mean score is used to summarize the response scores within a specific stakeholder group.
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index
The CSD in this research is driven by stakeholders and has three dimensions. The three dimensions are combined to develop a CSD index. The CSD index of a firm is computed according to the following equation:
Quantity xItemQuality xTypeQuality CSD SCORE
where CSD j = a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index of firm j; Quantity i = the disclosure or non-disclosure of an item i with regard to this item's disclosure type in firm j; ItemQuality i = the weight of the item i disclosed; TypeQuality i = the weight for the type (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, or both monetary and numerical)
of the item i disclosed; n = the number of items within the checklist; max(SCORE) = the highest score of three disclosed dimensions for a specified firm: disclosed quantity score x disclosed item quality score x disclosed type quality score.
Measures of board diversity
Four board diversity indices are constructed to measure board diversity: an unweighted diversity-of-boards index (UW_DoB), an unweighted diversity-in-boards index (UW_DiB), a weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB), and a weighted diversity-in-boards index 
Unweighted diversity-of-boards index
This study includes four structural attributes relating to the board, to construct the diversityof-boards indices. This study constructs UW_DoB using the cluster analysis method (Han and Kamber
2006) as employed in previous studies (Deza and Deza 2009, Hafsi and Turgut 2013
). This measurement represents dissimilarity among firm boards using the structural attributes of the board, and shows the extent to which all four structural attributes of the board in a given firm board are dissimilar from those of other firm boards in the sample.
Three main steps are used to ascertain the extent to which a board is dissimilar from the remaining boards. First, a matrix is developed by measuring the dissimilarity between a given firm and other firms, for each structural attribute of the board. Second, the extent of dissimilarity between a given firm and the other firms on all structural attributes (i.e., four attributes in this study) of the board is calculated. Third, the average dissimilarity between a given firm and the remaining firms in the sample is generated. This becomes the UW_DoB of the given firm.
The structural attributes of boards in this study contain binary and ratio scale data types.
Han and Kamber (2006) have shown how to measure inter-sample differences with different data types, and their approach is accordingly used here to quantify the inter-sample differences. This method lumps together several attributes in a single dissimilarity matrix and uses a standardized range with differences from 0 to 1 for all the attributes. Each attribute in a given firm is measured and compared to the same attribute in the remaining firms in the sample. If the measurement value is different, then that attribute value is recorded as different, and receives a score of more than zero; otherwise it is zero. Each attribute in a given firm is compared in this way. A higher scale represents higher diversity-of-boards. The details of this method are given in the Appendix. 
Unweighted diversity-in-boards index
where n = 1, …, N possible categories, and p is the percentage of members of the board of directors in the n th category. When Blau's index gains a large value, diversity-in-boards increases. However, in order to obtain a standardized range from zero to unity for all demographic diversity attributes, the method introduced by Agresti and Agresti (1978 UW_DiB is the sum of all the ranked attributes that are involved in the demographic diversity within a board for each firm, such that a higher value represents a higher diversity-in-boards.
Weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted diversity-in-boards indices
This study constructs a weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and weighted diversity- Each attribute is measured as the mean score from the questionnaire survey. It is then used to measure the weighted diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB) for that firm. The W_DiB is calculated as the sum of all four ranked attributes, and each ranked attribute is multiplied by the mean value of importance rating obtained from the survey. A higher value represents a higher diversity-in-boards in that firm. Table 5 .
Control variables
This study controls for the firm characteristics return on assets (ROA), auditors (
Empirical models: The effects of board diversity on CSD
The first and second hypotheses, which examine the impact of board diversity on CSD, are tested using the following two regression functions: Hence, banks and financial institutions are excluded. Table 2 shows the response rate to the different versions of the questionnaire; the average response rate was 60%. Table 3 shows the score distribution of 80 executives' perceptions regarding the attributes of board diversity. The mean scores vary between 5.13 (gender diversity) and 7.93 (nationality diversity), with the lowest being zero and the highest being 10. 
Results

Labor aspect (LA)
Panel A of Table 4 shows the ratings awarded by employees to the various reporting items concerning the labor aspect (LA). The highest mean score for those reporting items is 7.47 and the lowest is 6.44, out of a maximum possible score of 10 (column 2). In analyzing the disclosure types (columns 3 to 6) for the 15 reporting items (LA1 to LA15) for the labor aspect, employee respondents rated the highest scores, which are printed in bold in the Table, for items with numerical disclosures (9 items), i.e., LA2, LA3, LA15, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA9, LA13, and LA14, and for the reporting items with both monetary and numerical disclosures (6 items), i.e., LA1, LA6, LA8, LA10, LA11, and LA12. Meanwhile, the lowest scores, printed in italics in the table, were given to the items with monetary disclosures (11 items),
i.e., LA2, LA3, LA15, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA12, LA13, and LA14, and the items with narrative disclosures (4 items), i.e., LA1, LA6, LA10, and LA11. Table 4 , Panel B, provides the ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators for the various information items on the human rights aspect (HR). The highest mean score for the information items is 8.19 and the lowest is 6.38 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types (columns 3 to 6), out of 11 items (HR1 to HR11) in the human rights aspect, lawyers and regulators assigned the highest scores to the items with numerical disclosures (9 items), and to the items with both monetary and numerical disclosures (2 items). The items with narrative disclosures (10 items) and the items with monetary disclosures (1 item) received the lowest scores. Table 4 , Panel C, presents the ratings assigned by the members of local communities to the various reporting items concerning the societal aspect (SO). The highest mean score for the reporting items is 7.92 and the lowest is 6.22 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types (columns 3 to 6), out of 10 items (SO1 to SO10) in the societal aspect, local communities assigned the highest scores for all 10 items with both monetary and numerical disclosures.
Human rights (HR) aspect
Societal (SO) aspect
They assigned the lowest mean scores scores to all 10 items with narrative disclosures. Table 4 , Panel D, shows the ratings awarded by customers for the various reporting items about the product aspect (PR). The highest mean score for the reporting items is 8.08 and the lowest is 6.62 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types (columns 3 to 6), out of 9 items (PR1 to PR9) in the product aspect, customers assigned the highest scores for items with both monetary and numerical disclosures (8 items), and one item with narrative disclosure. They assigned the lowest scores to the items with narrative disclosures (5 items), monetary disclosures (3 items), and one item with numerical disclosure. is 27 percent with a range of 0 to 79.07 percent. HOSE and HNX for 2010 . CSD_INDEX = the stakeholderdriven, three-dimensional CSD index; UW_DoB = the unweighted index of diversity-of-boards; W_DoB = the weighted index of diversity-of-boards; UW_DiB = the unweighted index of diversity-in-boards; W_DiB = the weighted index of diversity-in-boards; AUDIT = 1 if firm's auditor is a Big Four and otherwise 0; ROA = net profit over the total assets; STOCK_EX = 1 if the firms listed on HOSE and 0 for firms listed on HNX; FOREIGN = the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign investors; STATE = the percentage of shareholding owned by the state. Table 6 Table 5 for description of each variable. Although UW_DoB is significantly positively correlated with CSD_INDEX with a coefficient of 0.147, the p-value is 0.092 (not tabulated).
Product (PR) aspect
Checking for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity
This study checks the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression analysis and finds that the maximum VIF is 1.59, which is less than 10, for all the regression models. Therefore, multicollinearity does not influence the empirical models tested in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009). To avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity (where observations have variable residual values), robust standard error (White 1980 ) is employed to investigate the impact of board diversity indices (UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, and W_DiB) on CSD (CSD_INDEX). Meanwhile, the coefficient estimates of both UW_DiB and W_DiB are positive and significant (p-values of 0.010 and 0.014, respectively), indicating that firms with greater diversity-in-boards have a positive influence on higher CSD, confirming hypothesis 2. 
Results of hypothesis tests
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see note below Table 5 for description of each variable.
The results for the control variables shown in Table 6 
Additional analysis and robustness tests 6.1 Board diversity and corporate social disclosure across four social aspects
To provide further insight, this study analyses the relationships between board diversity and CSD across four social aspects in the GRI 3.1 framework. These are labor practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. As is shown in Table 5 , information related to labor practices (LAD_INDEX) and product responsibility (PRD_INDEX) items is disclosed the most, with a mean value of 0.17 and 0.16, respectively. A minimum score of 0 for society (SOD_INDEX) and human rights (HRD_INDEX) aspects suggests that some firms do not disclose any information about their society and human rights aspects; in fact, of the 133 firms in the sample, only 18 firms (13.5%) disclose the human rights aspect, 74 firms (55.6%) disclose the society aspect, while all firms (133 firms or 100%) in the sample disclose the labor and product responsibility aspects.
Following Firth (1979) in omitting firms which definitely do not have any items to disclose, this study examines the impact of board diversity on society aspect disclosure for only the 74 listed firms that disclose the society aspect, whereas it assesses the impact of board diversity on labor aspect disclosure and on product responsibility aspect disclosure for 133 listed firms (full sample). Because only 18 firms disclose the human rights aspect, which does not provide an adequate sample size for regression modeling, the human rights disclosure aspect is not analyzed here. The regression is repeated by replacing CSD_INDEX in the models reported in Table 7 with the score of each of three aspects, i.e., labor practices (LAD_INDEX), product responsibility (PRD_INDEX), and society (SOD_INDEX) as the dependent variable. Because almost identical results are obtained by using either the unweighted or weighted index to measure board diversity, for brevity this study only presents the results using weighted indices of diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards. Other results are available upon request. significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 5 for description of 9 each variable.
10
Alternative regression specifications
11
In the primary analysis, this study measures diversity-in-boards indices (both weighted and 12 unweighted) through the terciles split method. An additional analysis is carried out to ensure 13 that the primary analysis is robust, and this study tests diversity-in-boards and CSD models by (Table 9 ). In addition, the results are cross checked using the return on 23 equity (ROE), which measures financial performance, instead of ROA, and the results do not 24 change (Table 9 ). significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 5 
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103
Annual reports are exclusively focused on in this study because they are considered to be 104 firms' most important public communication document. However, social disclosures could 105 also be provided in other ways such as press releases, the media, and the Internet, hence 106 future studies could explore the roles of other disclosure channels to examine firms' CSD.
107
Appendix.
108
Method of measuring unweighted diversity-of-boards index (UW_DoB) 109 First, the dissimilarity between a given firm and another firm is measured using a represented as the number of structural attributes of the firm board examined in this study.
114
These two data points are represented as (x i1 , x i2 , …, x ip ) and (x j1 , x j2 , …, x jp ) respectively.
115
The indicator = 1 with the assumption that attributes f is equal weighted relative to the 116 contribution.
118
Then, the contribution made by an attribute f to the dissimilar function between firm i and 119 firm j (i.e., ) is calculated. However, that computation is unique to each data type. As 120 attributes are measured using different data types, is calculated using different formulas 121 based on the data type of the attribute. The structural attributes of boards in this paper contain 122 binary and ratio scale data types, so the following formulas focus on these two data types: where h runs over all non-missing objects for attribute f.
128
The contribution of dissimilarity for all the different attributes (i.e., ) is normalized by 129 these formulates, and hence expresses on a common scale from 0 to 1. The average distance
130
(dissimilarity) to all the other boards is taken as follows (note that 1 is subtracted from the 131 number of firms in the sample in the denominator of the formula because this study compares Similarly, by using the above computations, the UW_DoB of firm board two, three, and four 188 are 0.73, 0.37, and 0.54, respectively. These results indicate that firm board 2 is the most 189 diverse (dissimilarity), while firm board 3 is the least diverse (dissimilarity). 
